# Adapting to game trees in zerosum imperfect information games 

Côme Fiegel ${ }^{1}$, Pierre Ménard ${ }^{2}$, Tadashi Kozuno ${ }^{3}$,<br>Rémi Munos ${ }^{4}$, Vianney Perchet ${ }^{1,5}$, Michal Valko ${ }^{4}$<br>${ }^{1}$ ENSAE Paris ${ }^{2}$ ENS Lyon ${ }^{3}$ Omron Sinic $X{ }^{4}$ DeepMind ${ }^{5}$ Criteo AI Lab

## Zero-sum (two players) imperfect information games

- State space $\mathcal{S}$, initial state $s_{1} \in \mathcal{S}$ and horizon $\mathrm{H}>0$
- At timestep $h \in[1 . . \mathrm{H}]$, the two players take actions $a \in \mathcal{A}$ and $b \in \mathcal{B}$
- Reward $r_{h}(s, a, b) \in[0,1]$ and transition to the next state $p_{h}(\cdot \mid s, a, b)$



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Imperfect information: Players only observe information sets $x(s) \in \mathcal{X}$ and $y(s) \in y$
Perfect recall: Players do not forget past observations and actions

## Approximate Nash equilibrium

Policies: Non-deterministic $\mu=(\mu(\cdot \mid x))_{x \in x}$ and $v=(v(\cdot \mid y))_{y \in y}$

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Objective $\rightarrow$ Approximate a Nash equilibrium

## Sequential learning

Interaction with the game: T episodes played using freely chosen profiles $\left(\mu^{\mathrm{t}}, \nu^{\mathrm{t}}\right)_{\mathrm{t} \in[1 . . \mathrm{T}]}$

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Small regrets $\Longleftrightarrow$ average profile $(\bar{\mu}, \bar{v})$ approximates a Nash equilibrium

Max player's point of view


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## Advantage

Episodic MDP with a tree-structure

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## Difficulty

Adversarial transitions $p^{t}$ that change between episodes

## Back to regret minimization

Objective: minimize $\mathfrak{R}_{\max }^{\top}=\max _{\mu} \sum_{\mathrm{t}=1}^{\mathrm{T}}\left[\mathrm{V}^{\mu, \nu^{\mathrm{t}}}-\mathrm{V}^{\mu^{\mathrm{t}}, \nu^{\mathrm{t}}}\right]$
FTRL approach : $\mu^{t+1}=\operatorname{argmax}_{\mu} \sum_{k=1}^{\mathrm{t}} \tilde{\mathrm{V}}^{\mu, v^{k}}-\Psi(\mu)$ with
■ $\tilde{V}^{\cdot}, \nu^{\mathrm{t}}$ estimated value at episode t as a function of $\mu$
■ $\Psi$ the regularizer

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How to choose $\Psi$ ?

## Regularizer choice

## First choice: BalancedFTRL

■ $\Psi_{p}(\mu)=$ negentropy (information set $\left.\mid \mu, p\right) / \eta$
■ Compute balanced transitions $\mathrm{p}^{\star}$ and use $\Psi_{p^{*}}$

- $\mathfrak{R}_{\text {max }}^{\top}=\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{\mathrm{H}|\mathcal{X}||\mathcal{A}| \mathrm{T}})$


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## Second choice: AdaptiveFTRL

- Estimate cumulative transitions $\tilde{P}^{t}$

■ "Replace" $\mathrm{p}^{\star}$ with $\tilde{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{t}}$
■ $\mathfrak{R}_{\text {max }}^{\top}=\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\mathrm{H} \sqrt{|\mathcal{X}||\mathcal{A}| \mathrm{T}})$

## Conclusion

| Algorithm | Sample complexity | Structure-free |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| IXOMD | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\mathrm{H}^{2}\left(\|\mathcal{X}\|^{2}\|\mathcal{A}\|+\|\mathcal{Y}\|^{2}\|\mathcal{B}\|\right) / \epsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ |
| BalancedOMD | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\mathrm{H}^{3}\left(\|\mathcal{X}\|\|\mathcal{A}\|+\|y\|\|\mathcal{B}\| / \epsilon^{2}\right)\right)$ | $x$ |
| BalancedFTRL | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\mathrm{H}(\|\mathcal{X}\|\|\mathcal{A}\|+\|y\|\|\mathcal{B}\|) / \epsilon^{2}\right)$ | $x$ |
| AdaptiveFTRL | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\mathrm{H}^{2}(\|\mathcal{X}\|\|\mathcal{A}\|+\|y\|\|\mathcal{B}\|) / \epsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Lower bound | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\mathrm{H}(\|\mathcal{X}\|\|\mathcal{A}\|+\|y\|\|\mathcal{B}\|) / \epsilon^{2}\right)$ | - |

Contact: come.fiegel@gmail.com

