

# Best of both worlds: Stochastic & adversarial best-arm identification

Yasin Abbasi-Yadkori, Peter Bartlett, Victor Gabillon,  
Alan Malek, Michal Valko



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## Problem formulation

For  $t = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ,

- ▶ simultaneously, **Learner** picks arm  $I_t \in [K]$ , ( $K$  arms)
- ▶ **Adversary** 😈 / **environment** 🏔️ picks gain  $g_t \in [0, 1]^K$ .
- ▶ Then, the learner observes  $g_{t, I_t}$ .

Recommend arm  $J_n$  hoping  $J_n = k^*$ .

**Objective:** Minimizing the probability of misidentification of  $k^*$ :



**Adversarial**

arbitrary  $g_{k,t}$

$$k_g^* = \arg \max_{k \in [K]} G_k$$

$$G_k = \sum_{t=1}^n g_{k,t}$$

$$e_{\text{adv}}(n) \triangleq \mathbb{P}(J_n \neq k_g^*)$$

😈 maximizes  $e_{\text{adv}}(n)$



**Stochastic**


$g_{k,t}$  sampled i.i.d. from  $\nu_k$

$$k_{\text{sto}}^* = \arg \max_{k \in [K]} \mu_k$$


$$e_{\text{sto}}(n) \triangleq \mathbb{P}(J_n \neq k_{\text{sto}}^*)$$

🏔️ is indifferent to  $e_{\text{sto}}(n)$

## Worst-case adversarial analysis

State of the art in : Successive Rejects (SR) (Audibert et al, 2010)

- SR can pull arm deterministically
- SR stops to pull some arms (eliminate/reject) during the game

SR can be tricked by an adversary 

- The learner needs to use internal randomization
- The learner should be careful about rejecting arm: no rejection!

## Optimal uniform learner against 😊

RULE:  $I_t$  uniformly at random, returns the estimated best arm.

### Theorem (Rule vs. 😊)

For all  $n$ , adversarial  $g$ ,

$$e_{\text{adv}(g)}(n) = \mathcal{O} \left( \exp \left( -\frac{n}{H_{\text{UNIF}(g)}} \right) \right).$$


### Theorem (😊 Lower bound)

For any learner, a  $g^1$  of complexity  $H_{\text{UNIF}}$ ,

$$e_{g^1}(n) = \Omega \left( \exp \left( -\frac{n}{H_{\text{UNIF}}} \right) \right).$$


RULE: optimal gap-dependent rates against 😊.

## Gaps and complexities in hindsight



$$H_{\text{UNIF}} \triangleq \frac{K}{\Delta_{(1)}^2}$$


## Gaps and complexities in hindsight



$$H_{\text{UNIF}} \triangleq \frac{K}{\Delta_{(1)}^2} \quad \& \quad H_{\text{SR}} \triangleq \max_{k \in [K]} \frac{k}{\Delta_{(k)}^2}.$$

Stochastic case

## Gaps and complexities in hindsight



$$H_{\text{UNIF}} \triangleq \frac{K}{\Delta_{(1)}^2} \geq H_{\text{SR}} \triangleq \max_{k \in [K]} \frac{k}{\Delta_{(k)}^2}.$$

Stochastic case

## ¿Best of both worlds? (BOB)

Existing robust solutions?

		$e_{\text{sto}}(n)$		$e_{\text{adv}(g)}(n)$
SR	✓	$e^{\frac{-n}{H_{\text{SR}} \log K}}$	✗	1
RULE	✗	$e^{\frac{-n}{H_{\text{UNIF}}}}$	✓	$e^{\frac{-n}{H_{\text{UNIF}}}}$

**BOB question:** *A learner performing optimally in both the stochastic and adversarial cases while not being aware of the nature of the rewards ?*



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## ¡IMPOSSIBLE BOB!

### New notion of complexity

$$H_{\text{BOB}} \triangleq \frac{1}{\Delta_{(1)}} \max_{k \in [K]} \frac{k}{\Delta_{(k)}}.$$

### Theorem (Lower bound for the BOB challenge)

For any learner, for any  $H_{\text{BOB}}$  there exists a stochastic problem with complexity  $H_{\text{BOB}}$  such that

if  $e_{\text{sto}}(n) \leq \frac{1}{64} \exp\left(-\frac{2048n}{H_{\text{BOB}}}\right)$  sometimes  $\frac{1}{64} \exp\left(-\frac{2048n}{H_{\text{SR}}\sqrt{K}}\right)$ ,

then there exists an adversarial problem where

$$e_{\text{adv}(g)}(n) \geq \frac{1}{16}.$$

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then there exists an adversarial problem where

$$e_{\text{adv}(g)}(n) \geq \frac{1}{16}.$$

## Is there still a challenge?

**YES!** because

$$H_{\text{SR}} \leq H_{\text{BOB}} \leq H_{\text{UNIF}}.$$

### Why is the BOB question challenging?

- ▶ **Bias** of estimator  $\hat{G}_{k,t} \propto \sum_{t'=1}^t \mathbf{1}\{I_{t'} = k\} g_{k,t'}$  (simple average)
- ▶ **Variance** of  $\tilde{G}_{k,t} = \sum_{t'=1}^t \frac{g_{k,t'}}{p_{k,t'}} \mathbf{1}\{I_{t'} = k\}$  (importance weights)

Pull uniformly for too long and incur a large **variance** of order  $K$  in  $\tilde{G}_{k,t}$ .

Objective: reduce the variance of the estimators of the best arms  
 $\approx$  find the best arm

## The P1 algorithm

- P1 pulls
- the  $\widehat{best}$  arm with 'probability' **1**
  - the second  $\widehat{best}$  arm with 'probability'  $\frac{1}{2}$
  - the third  $\widehat{best}$  arm with 'probability'  $\frac{1}{3}$
  - and so on...
  - the  $i$ -th  $\widehat{best}$  arm with 'probability'  $\frac{1}{i}$
  - and the  $\widehat{worst}$  arm with 'probability'  $\frac{1}{K}$
  - (and normalize)

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
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## The P1 algorithm

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  - the second  $\widehat{best}$  arm with 'probability'  $\frac{1}{2 \log K}$
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
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**W.r.t. Rule, p1 early bets are almost costless!**

P1 follows the allocation proportions of SR


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
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P1 achieves the '*best you can wish for*' (up to log factor) + we have some experiments

**Thank you!**